CLAIMS

Having thus described our invention, what we claim as new and desire to secure by Letters Patent is as follows:

1. A method of processing semiotic data, comprising:

receiving biometric data including a data set P;

selecting a function h, and for at least one of each said data set P to be collected, computing h(P);

destroying said data set P; and

storing h(P) in a database, wherein said data set P cannot be extracted

10 from h(P).

- 2. The method according to claim 1, wherein said semiotic data comprises biometric data.
- 3. The method according to claim 1, wherein said function h comprises a secure hash function.
- 15 4. The method according to claim 1, further comprising:

to determine whether P' is a predetermined subject, comparing h(P') to all available h(P)s to determine whether there is a match.

YO999-137

24

| 5. | The method ad | cording to claim 1, further comprising: |
|-----|------------------|--|
| | selecting a | private key/public key (K, k) once for all cases; and |
| | one of des | troying said private key K and sending said private key K to |
| a t | rusted party; an | d\ |

choosing said function h as the public encryption function corresponding to k.

- 6. The method according to claim 5, wherein said data set P cannot be extracted from h(P), except by the trusted party.
- 7. The method according to claim 5, further comprising:

to determine whether some P' is a predetermined subject, comparing said h(P') to all available h(P)s; and determining whether there is a match.

- 8. The method according to claim 5, wherein the trusted party comprises a panel of members, and
- wherein a secret is shared among the members so that only at least a predetermined number of panel members can reconstitute the secret in its entirety by putting together their share of the secret.

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9. The method according to claim 1, wherein the data set *P* is not determined perfectly by its reading,

wherein each reading gives a number Pi, wherein i is no less than 0, wherein P0 is for an initial reading, and a secret version of said initial reading is stored after further processing thereof,

wherein reading P0 is different from Pi for i > 0, and the secret version of P0 is different from the secret version of Pi, such that no identification is possible by a direct comparison of the encrypted data.

10. The method according to claim 9, further comprising:

extracting sub-collections Sj from the collection of data in data set P; and

encrypting a predetermined number of such sub-collections such that at least one of the sub-collections is reproduced exactly with a predetermined probability.

15 11. The method according to claim 10, further comprising:

comparing encrypted versions of the sub-collections Sj with those data stored in said database,

wherein if one or more of the sub-collection Sj matches with said data, then verification is deemed to have occurred.

12. The method according to claim 11, further comprising:

each time a Pi, with i > 0, is read, computing all possible

predetermined size variations of Pi which correspond to an acceptable

predetermined imprecision of the reading; and

encrypting all such modified data, and comparing said encrypted modified data to data stored in said database.

- 13. The method according to claim 12, wherein for a plurality of users of the same biometric information, said biometric information is encrypted differently for each user.
- 14. The method according to claim 1, wherein said data set comprises a personal data set.
 - 15. A method of processing biometric data, comprising:

 acquiring unencrypted biometric data including at least one data set P;

 encrypting, with one of a secure hash function and an identity function,
 each said at least one data set acquired;

destroying the unencrypted data set P; and storing each of the at least one encrypted data set in a database, wherein unencrypted biometric data is not available nor retrievable from said data stored in said database.

YO999-137

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16. The method according to claim 15, wherein said data set comprises a personal data set.

17. A method of extracting components of biometric data which are stable under measurement errors, comprising:

acquiring unencrypted biometric data including at least one data set P; encrypting each said at least one data set acquired to form at least one encrypted data set;

destroying the inencrypted data set P; and

storing each said at least one encrypted data set in a database, wherein unencrypted biometric data is not available nor retrievable from said data stored in said database.

18. The method according to claim 17, wherein said data set comprises a personal data set

19. A method of extracting components of biometric data which are stable under measurement errors, comprising:

acquiring unencrypted biometric data including at least one data set P; encrypting each said at least one data set acquired to form at least one encrypted data set;

destroying the unencrypted data set P; and

storing each said at least one encrypted data set in a database, wherein unencrypted biometric data is not available nor retrievable from said data stored in said database,

extracting sub-collections Sj from the collection of data in said data set P; and

encrypting a predetermined number of such sub-collections such that at least one of the sub-collections is reproduced exactly with a predetermined probability.

- 20. The method according to claim 19, wherein said data set comprises a personal data set.
 - 21. The method according to claim 19, further comprising:

comparing encrypted versions of the sub-collections Sj with those data stored in said database,

- wherein if one or more of the sub-collection Sj matches with said data, then verification is deemed to have occurred.
 - 22. The method according to claim 21, wherein a data set P is not determined perfectly by its reading, such that each reading gives a number Pi, wherein i is

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no less than 0, wherein P0 is for an initial reading, and a secret version of said initial reading is stored after further processing thereof,

wherein reading P0 is different from Pi for i > 0, and the secret version of P0 is different from the secret version of Pi, such that no identification is possible by a direct comparison of the encrypted data.

23. The method according to/claim 21, further comprising:

each time a data set is read Pi, with i > 0, is read, computing all possible predetermined size variations of Pi which correspond to an acceptable predetermined imprecision of the reading; and

encrypting all such modified data, and comparing said encrypted modified data to data stored in said database.

24. A system for/processing semiotic data, comprising:

means for receiving semiotic data including a data set P;

means for selecting a function h, and for each said data set P to be

15 collected, computing h(P);

means for destroying said data set P; and

means for storing h(P) in a database, wherein said data set P cannot be extracted from h(P).

- 25. A system of processing semiotic data as in claim 25, wherein said semiotic data comprises biometric data.
- 26. The method according to claim 24, wherein said data set comprises a personal data set.
- 5 27. A system for verifying biometric data without storing unencrypted biometric data, comprising:

means for acquiring unencrypted biometric data including at least one data set P;

means for encrypting each said at least one data set acquired to form at least one encrypted data set;

means for destroying the unencrypted data set P; and means for storing each said at least one encrypted data set in a database, wherein unencrypted biometric data is not available nor retrievable from said data stored in said database.

- 28. The method according to claim 27, wherein said data set comprises a personal data set.
 - 29. A system for extracting components of biometric data which are stable under measurement errors, comprising:

acquiring unencrypted biometric data including at least one data set *P*; encrypting each said at least one data set acquired to form at least one encrypted data set;

destroying the unencrypted data set P; and

storing each said at least one encrypted data set in a database, wherein unencrypted biometric data is not available nor retrievable from said data stored in said database,

extracting sub-collections Sj from the collection of data in said data set P; and

encrypting a predetermined number of such sub-collections such that at least one of the sub-collections is reproduced exactly with a predetermined probability.

- 30. The method according to claim 29, wherein said data set comprises a personal data set.
- 31. A signal-bearing medium langibly embodying a program of machinereadable instructions executable by a digital processing apparatus to perform a method for computer-implemented processing biometric data, said method comprising:

receiving biometric data including a data set P;

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selecting a secure hash function h, and for each data set P to be collected, computing h(P);

destroying said data set P;

storing h(P) in a database, wherein said data set P cannot be extracted from h(P).

- 32. The method according to claim 31, wherein said data set comprises a personal data set.
- 33. A signal-bearing medium tangibly embodying a program of machine-readable instructions executable by a digital processing apparatus to perform a method for computer-implemented verifying of biometric data without storing unencrypted biometric data, said method comprising:

acquiring unencrypted biometric data including at least one data set P; encrypting each said at least one data set acquired to form at least one encrypted data set;

destroying the unencrypted data set P; and

storing each said at least one encrypted data set in a database, wherein unencrypted biometric data is not available nor retrievable from said data stored in said database.

34. The method according to claim 32, wherein said data set comprises a personal data set.

35. A signal-bearing medium tangibly embodying a program of machinereadable instructions executable by a digital processing apparatus to perform a method for computer-implemented extracting components of biometric data which are stable under measurement errors, said method comprising:

acquiring unencrypted biometric data including at least one data set P; encrypting each said at least one data set acquired to form at least one encrypted data set;

destroying the unencry/pted data set P;

storing each said at least one encrypted data set in a database, wherein unencrypted biometric data is not available nor retrievable from said data stored in said database;

extracting sub-collections Sj from the collection of data in said data set

15 P; and

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encrypting a predetermined number of such sub-collections such that at least one of the sub-collections is reproduced exactly with a predetermined probability.

36. The method according to claim 35, wherein said data set comprises a personal data set.